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Things Fall Apart (Next Door)
DISCRIMINATORY MAINTENANCE AND
DECREASED HOME VALUES AS THE NEXT FAIR
HOUSING BATTLEGROUND
Michelle Y. Ewert†
INTRODUCTION
It is not that United States Supreme Court Justice Clarence
Thomas does not like Wanda Onafuwa or Chevelle Bushnell.1 He
has probably never met them. But one thing is clear: if the U.S.
Supreme Court considers whether these women have standing
under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) to sue Bank of America for
discriminatory maintenance of the foreclosed properties located
next door to them, Justice Thomas will almost certainly oppose
their efforts to protect their civil rights, and the conservatives on
the Court would likely agree. In Thomas’ dissenting opinion in
Bank of America Corporation v. City of Miami involving a city that
sued a bank for discriminatory maintenance of foreclosed
properties, Justice Thomas said “[n]o one suggests that
[neighboring] homeowners could sue under the FHA, and I think it
is clear that they cannot.”2 Justice Thomas is wrong. Not only do
Ms. Onafuwa and Ms. Bushnell have standing to sue, so do their
neighbors down the street and a few blocks over.

† Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law. J.D.,
University of Wisconsin. M.P.P., University of Minnesota. I would like to thank Merrill
Ewert, Priscilla Ewert, and Mo Speller for reading early drafts; the faculty of the UDC
David A. Clarke School of Law for inviting me to present this paper at the 2018 fair housing
junior scholars workshop and Faith Mullen for her especially thoughtful feedback; Tim
Laughlin, Atticus Disney, and David Dennis for their invaluable assistance as my research
assistants; Washburn University School of Law for its generous summer research stipend;
Michele Gilman, Patricia Judd, and Frédéric Sourgens for their enthusiastic cheerleading
and guidance; my working group at the 2018 Clinical Law Review Writers Workshop for
the many good ideas to strengthen the article; the students at the Brooklyn Law Review for
their excellent edits; Alice Eberhart-Wright and Lee Wright for all the coffee breaks and
Saturday night dinners; and my sister, Stephanie Galvin, for helping ensure that activists
and scholars have reliable data to support their work.
1 Wanda Onafuwa and Chevelle Bushnell are plaintiffs in a case against Bank
of America pending in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
Along with organizational plaintiffs, these women sued Bank of America for
discriminatory maintenance of foreclosed properties located next to their homes.
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 4–6, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Bank of Am., Nat’l
Assoc. (D. Md. 2018) (No. 1:18-CV-01919-CCB).
2 Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1312 (2017).
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Justice Thomas’ error is not a trifle. Neighboring
homeowners incur expenses when forced to address conditions
problems in poorly maintained, adjacent foreclosed units.3 Indeed,
Bank of America’s failure to maintain foreclosed properties next to
Ms. Onafuwa and Ms. Bushnell cost them money.4 Both women
experienced rodent infestations coming from the adjacent
properties, water from the next-door property leaked into Ms.
Onafuwa’s basement, and Ms. Bushnell had to pay for a security
system and security doors after robbers made both successful and
unsuccessful attempts to break into her property from the vacant
house.5 Ms. Onafuwa described the stress of the rodent infestation,
saying “I’ve had nights when I couldn’t sleep because I’m worried
about rodents.”6 Ms. Bushnell articulated fears about break-ins,
saying “It’s stressful . . . You get to the point where you’re
barricading yourself in the house because you have to protect what
you have.”7 Unfortunately, the risk of infestations and crime
spreading from foreclosed properties are just some of the problems
stemming from discriminatory maintenance.
The presence of foreclosed properties also reduces
neighboring home values.8 For many American households, the
home is the most significant asset they own.9 By depressing the
value of their homes, banks’ actions are leading to the depletion of
many families’ home equity and, thus, asset base.10 Ms. Onafuwa
and Ms. Bushnell are not alone. They are two of millions of people
3 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-31, VACANT PROPERTIES:
GROWING NUMBER INCREASES COMMUNITIES’ COSTS AND CHALLENGES 28 (2011), https://
www.gao.gov/assets/590/586089.pdf [https://perma.cc/YLN7-U67J]; Complaint and Demand
for Jury Trial, supra note 1, at 95–100.
4 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 1.
5 Id. at 94–100.
6 Lynh Bui, Squatters, Overgrown Grass, Trashed Lawns: Frustrated
Homeowners Sue Banks Claiming Bias, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/squatters-overgrown-grass-trashed-lawnsfrustrated-homeowners-sue-banks-claiming-discrimination-banks-say-theyre-notresponsible-for-longtime-inequities/2018/10/06/3e14fedc-2176-11e8-94daebf9d112159c_story.html?utm_term=.9bb2fa69176f [https://perma.cc/M4LR-BGXT].
7 Id.
8 Justin P. Steil & Dan Traficonte, A Flood-Not A Ripple-of Harm: Proximate
Cause Under the Fair Housing Act, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237, 1279 (2019); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 3, at 44; Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External
Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property
Values, 17 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 57, 58 (2006).
9 Kasey Curtis, The Burst Bubble: Revisiting Foreclosure Law in Light of the
Collapse of the Housing Industry, 36 W. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 120 (2008).
10 According to the Center for Responsible Lending, one of the “spillover
effects” of the foreclosure crisis is a drop in home equity of neighboring households due
to reduced property values. 2013: Update: The Spillover Effects of Foreclosures, CTR. FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgagelending/research-analysis/2013-crl-research-update-foreclosure-spillover-effects-finalaug-19-docx.pdf [https://perma.cc/CDY9-LRFN].
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in a similar position. One study from 2013 estimates that over
ninety-five million households had lost home equity due to
foreclosures in their neighborhoods.11 When one aggregates the
losses suffered by these families the amount of money is
staggering: about $2.2 trillion dollars in property value lost
between 2007 and 2012, and over half of that in communities of
color.12 To say that homeowners like Ms. Onafuwa and Ms.
Bushnell do not have standing to sue creates a massive windfall for
the banking industry at the expense of the life savings of minority
families. Because of the loss of home value, in addition to the direct
expenses incurred, neighboring homeowners have standing to sue
banks that engage in discriminatory maintenance.
This story of discrimination against people of color did not
start when Bank of America took over the property next door to
Ms. Onafuwa in 2017 or the one next to Ms. Bushnell in 2014.13
Nor did it begin when Ms. Onafuwa purchased her house in
Baltimore, Maryland, in 1988 or when Ms. Bushnell purchased
hers in District Heights, Maryland, in 1990.14 Instead, this story
began when Black people were forcibly removed from Africa,
when their descendants labored for generations under slavery,
and when the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of those
enslaved people—despite being free—faced countless barriers to
education, housing, and employment.15 This is the story of
profiteering at the expense of people of color and banks that
actively practice discrimination, even in 2019.
The mechanisms of discrimination may have evolved over
the last hundred years, but the effects remain the same. Early in
the twentieth century, households of color were prevented from
acquiring homes in certain neighborhoods through racial zoning
and restrictive covenants.16 Later, banks denied them access to
mortgages based on discriminatory redlining practices.17 More
recently, banks engaged in predatory lending in communities of
11 This study used data collected through the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA), the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, and Lender Processing
Services, a private company, to determine the spillover effect of foreclosures generally on
neighboring property values. Id.
12 Id.
13 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 1, at 93–98.
14 Id.
15 See generally Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/
[https://perma.cc/335U-TCVE].
16 See infra Section I.C.
17 “Redlining” is the term used to describe banks’ “practice of refusing to make
loans . . . in particular areas.” Fair Housing: Implementation of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, 53 Fed. Reg. 44992, 44998 (proposed Nov. 7, 1988) (to be
codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100); see also infra Sections I.B. and II.B.
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color, flooding them with subprime mortgages, which fueled the
2008 foreclosure crisis and exacerbated racial inequities.18 Now, in
addition to placing Black and Latinx homeowners at greater risk
for foreclosure than others, mounting evidence shows that many
financial institutions do not invest the same resources in
maintaining their foreclosed properties in neighborhoods of color
as they do in White neighborhoods.19 When banks practice
discriminatory maintenance of foreclosed properties, it decreases
the value of other homes in those neighborhoods.20 The cycle of
banks preying on communities of color for profit continues.
The 2017 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bank of America
v. City of Miami, Florida, decided on the eve of the fiftieth
anniversary of the Fair Housing Act and the tenth anniversary of
the housing crisis, presented an opportunity to explore new solutions
to the ongoing housing discrimination against communities of
color.21 This article argues that the FHA offers neighboring
homeowners a cause of action against banks that discriminate in
their maintenance of foreclosed properties. It expands existing fair
housing theory by suggesting protections for people previously seen
as outside fair housing law’s zone of interest.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the
importance of homeownership in creating wealth and opportunity.
It then explores the enormous disparity between Black and White
households in homeownership rates and wealth accumulation—
the result of a history of discrimination. In particular, this section
documents the barriers people of color have faced when trying to
access capital, purchase property, and choose where to live.
Part II of this article reviews the evolution of federal fair
housing law and its role in helping people of color and other
protected classes access housing and economic opportunity.
Specifically, it examines case law establishing the right of action for
discrimination based on neighborhood characteristics rather than
just individual characteristics. It shows how, over the years, courts
found that mortgage redlining, reverse redlining, and redlining in
insurance and discriminatory appraisals violate the FHA. By the
logic of this well-developed case law, this article argues that banks

See infra Section I.C.
Id.
20 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 3, at 46; Immergluck & Smith,
supra note 8, at 11; 2013: Update: The Spillover Effects of Foreclosures, supra note 10.
21 See generally Bank of Am. Corp. v. Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1296 (2017). Congress
passed the Fair Housing Act in April of 1968. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1968). The subprime mortgage
crisis lasted from around 2007 to 2010. John V. Duca, Subprime Mortgage Crisis, FED. RESERVE
HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/subprime_mortgage_crisis
[https://perma.cc/P733-JE4U].
18

19
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similarly violate the FHA when engaging in the discriminatory
maintenance of foreclosed properties in communities of color.
Part III extends that reasoning, arguing that homeowners
whose property values have dropped because of banks’
discriminatory maintenance of foreclosed properties in their
neighborhoods have a cause of action against those banks under
the FHA. This section responds to the argument that loss of
economic value of property does not confer standing under the
FHA, analogizing the basis for municipal standing in the recent
Supreme Court decision in Bank of America to that of neighboring
homeowners. This section then confirms this analysis by exploring
the FHA’s legislative history to show that the drafters of the FHA
viewed access to housing as a strategy for promoting access to
social and economic opportunity. In that context, the FHA’s
ultimate goal was to combat a broad range of social problems.
When the homes of persons of color are devalued because of banks’
discriminatory action, there are ripple effects in all other parts of
their lives. This article concludes that neighboring homeowners
can and should bring claims against banks engaging in
discriminatory maintenance of foreclosed properties that reduces
the value of other homes in the neighborhood.
The final Part of this article briefly addresses two
challenges facing neighboring homeowners wishing to sue banks
under the FHA. The first is the question of whether the FHA
applies to post-acquisition discrimination or only to discrimination
that affects initial access to housing. This section summarizes the
arguments scholars make to show how some recent court decisions
inappropriately restrict application of the FHA. The second
challenge relates to the proximate cause standard to be applied
under the FHA. This section discusses the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision addressing this
issue and the implications for future litigation by neighboring
homeowners. Finally, this article advances the fair housing
discourse by showing how existing jurisprudence on neighborhoodbased discrimination and municipal standing under the FHA can
be applied to neighboring homeowners affected by discriminatory
maintenance of foreclosed properties.
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I.

THE IMPORTANCE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP AND HISTORIC
BARRIERS TO ACCESS TO HOUSING

A.

Race-Based Disparities in Homeownership and Wealth

Homeownership confers significant benefits to families.22
Equity in the family home helps homeowners accumulate wealth
and weather financial crises.23 Further, home equity allows
homeowners to pursue other goals—such as education or starting
a small business—through access to credit.24 These investments, in
turn, produce additional wealth. That wealth can be used by the
homeowner to pursue additional opportunities or can be passed on
to family members. Indeed, inheritances and inter vivos transfers
play an important, ongoing role in helping White people
accumulate wealth at a rate unmatched in families of color.25 In one
study that followed families for twenty-five years, thirty-six
percent of White people received an inheritance while only seven
percent of Black people did.26 Further, White beneficiaries received
about ten times more than Black beneficiaries.27
The disparity in homeownership rates and wealth based on
race are equally striking.28 According to the Census Bureau, in
2017 the White (non-Hispanic) homeownership rate was 72.3
22 See, e.g., Jared Ruiz Bybee, In Defense of Low-Income Homeownership, 5
ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 107, 130 (2013); Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and
the Struggle for Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511–13 (2007).
23 See Nancy A. Denton, The Role of Residential Segregation in Promoting and
Maintaining Inequality in Wealth and Property, 34 IND. L. REV. 1199, 1206 (2001); Alice
M. Thomas, The Racial Wealth Divide Through the Eyes of the Younger Family: Undoing
America’s Legacy of Wealth Inequality in Search of the Elusive American Dream Utilizing
a Sankofa Model of Transitional Justice, 5 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009); Maury
Gittleman & Edward N. Wolff, Racial Wealth Disparities: Is the Gap Closing? 5-6 (Levy
Econ. Inst. Working Paper No. 311, 2000).
24 Iglesias, supra note 22, at 521–22; john a. powell, Opportunity-Based Housing,
12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 188, 195 (2003).
25 Denton, supra note 23, at 1208; Daria Roithmayr, Them That Has, Gets, 27
MISS. C. L. REV. 373, 380 (2008); Gittleman & Wolff, supra note 23, at 1–2.
26 TATJANA MESCHEDE, ET AL., WEALTH INEQUALITIES IN GREATER BOSTON: DO
RACE AND ETHNICITY MATTER? 7 (2016), https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/communi
ty-development-discussion-paper/2016/wealth-inequalities-in-greater-boston-do-race-andethnicity-matter.aspx [https://perma.cc/3YEA-PPCS]; THOMAS SHAPIRO, ET AL., THE ROOTS
OF THE WIDENING RACIAL WEALTH GAP: EXPLAINING THE BLACK-WHITE ECONOMIC DIVIDE
5 (2013), https://community-wealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/
paper-shapiro-et-al.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY6T-9VV2].
27 MESCHEDE, supra note 26, at 7.
28 Because the relevant Census categories for race and Hispanic origin are labeled
“White alone,” “White alone, not Hispanic” or “Non-Hispanic White alone,” “Black alone,”
“Hispanic origin (any race)” or “Hispanic or Latino,” and “Not of Hispanic origin” or “NonHispanic,” this portion of this article uses that language, although the remainder of the article
refers to the Latinx community, which is the current practice amongst scholars. See, e.g.,
Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, tbl. 22 Homeownership Rates by Race and Ethnicity
of Householder: 1994 to 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2017), https://www.census.gov/housing/
hvs/data/ann17ind.html [https://perma.cc/V63M-ELAV].
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percent, the Black homeownership rate was 42.3 percent, and the
Hispanic homeownership rate was 46.2 percent.29 Just prior to the
housing crisis in 2007, the homeownership rate was 75.2 percent
for White (non-Hispanic), 47.2 percent for Black, and 49.7 percent
for Hispanic people.30 During the housing crisis, homeownership
rates dropped more for Black and Latinx households than White
households. These continue to be substantially higher in White
than in Black and Latinx communities—and the disparity between
White and Black households is growing.31
The wealth gap is even greater. Census Bureau data from
2013 show that the median net worth for White (not Hispanic)
households was $132,483, for Black households was $9,211, and for
Hispanic households was $12,458.32 This means that median net
worth for Black households is only seven percent of the White
median household net worth. The median net worth of Latinx
households is only 9.4 percent of the median net worth of White
households. Excluding equity in the family’s home, the median net
worth for White (not Hispanic) households was $51,100; for Black
households, it was $2,725 and for Hispanic households, $5,825.33
This means that excluding the family home, Black median
household net worth is only 5.3 percent and Latinx median
household net worth is only 11.4 percent of White median
household net worth.34 This disparity is staggering and unlikely to
change anytime soon.
A 2011 Pew Research Center report showed that wealth
gaps between White, Hispanic, and Black people had reached their
highest levels in twenty-five years.35 It also documented the impact
of the Great Recession and 2008 housing crisis by comparing
changes in net worth between 2005 and 2009. During that period,
the median net worth for White households fell by sixteen percent;
the median net worth for Hispanic households dropped by sixty-six
percent, and for Black households, it dropped fifty-three percent.36
Id.
Id.
31 Id. at tbl. 16. Quarterly Homeownership Rates by Race and Ethnicity of
Householder: 1994 to Present, https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/data/histtabs.html
[https://perma.cc/M9N6-TS6R].
32 Wealth, Asset Ownership, & Debt of Households Detailed Tables: 2013 at tbl. 1.
Median Value of Assets for Households, by Type of Asset owned and Selected Characteristics: 2013,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2013), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2013/demo/wealth/wealth-assetownership.html [https://perma.cc/QC44-L38N].
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 RAKESH KOCHHAR, RICHARD FRY & PAUL TAYLOR, WEALTH GAPS RISE TO RECORD
HIGHS BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS, HISPANICS, CH. 2 (2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/20
11/07/26/chapter-2-household-wealth [https://perma.cc/5ALF-FB3E].
36 Id.
29
30
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When home equity was excluded from the calculation, however,
median net worth declined by only $479 for Hispanic households
(fourteen percent) and only $626 for Black households (a thirtyseven percent decline).37 As one scholar describes this situation,
many Black families are “working without a safety net.”38 The same
is true for many Latinx families. Clearly, home value constitutes
the most significant part of Black and Latinx household wealth.
Given that home value constitutes a much higher percentage of
their portfolios than those of White families, protecting home value
is crucial for building estates that people of color can leave to their
children and grandchildren.39
B.

Limited Access to Capital as a Barrier to
Homeownership

Several race-based factors have created differential access
to capital and, therefore, housing. First, Black families have had
fewer generations in which to accumulate wealth than their
White counterparts as a result of slavery and Jim Crow policies.40
Second, people of color have historically earned—and continue to
earn—less than White people.41 Third, discriminatory lending
policies have prevented many people of color from obtaining credit
and thereby building equity through home ownership.42
The impact of slavery and Jim Crow policies on wealth
accumulation in Black families cannot be overstated. Even after the
demise of slavery, freed Black people faced significant barriers to
economic success.43 The sharecropping system afforded little
opportunity for economic advancement and many White landowners
outright cheated the Black sharecroppers.44 Neither Congress nor
the States redistributed land to the recently freed Black people and
laws in some areas prevented them from working independently or
owning businesses.45 During the twentieth century, important
Id.
Coates, supra note 15.
39 See generally Gittleman & Wolff, supra note 23.
40 Coates, supra note 15.
41 According to Census data, in 2017, the median income for White (nonHispanic) households was $68,125, whereas median income for Black households was
$40,258 and for Hispanic (any race) households was $50,486. Housing Vacancies and
Homeownership, supra note 28, at tbl. 1. Income and Earnings Summary Measures by
Selected Characteristics: 2016 and 2017, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2018/demo/
income-poverty/p60-263.html [https://perma.cc/9ZX7-R3X3].
42 MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH, 1923 (10th ANNIVERSARY ED. 2006); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID 105 (1993).
43 Coates, supra note 15.
44 Id.
45 powell, supra note 24, at 196; Thomas, supra note 23, at 32–33.
37
38

2019]

THINGS FALL APART (NEXT DOOR)

1149

government benefit programs excluded those who were Black.46 For
example, the welfare program was designed to mostly exclude Black
families.47 Social security benefits and unemployment insurance did
not apply to domestic or agricultural workers, who were
predominantly Black.48 Consequently, seniors had to spend their
savings to support themselves in their old age rather than being able
to pass on their savings to their children and grandchildren.49
Compounding wealth over the generations drives the
wealth gap between Black and White people,50 and the Native
American and Latinx communities have faced their own barriers
to passing on wealth.51 In one study of multigenerational family
wealth, researchers found that grandparental wealth played a
much larger role in grandchildren’s wealth than previously
believed.52 Many grandparents invest in grandchildren in early
childhood, including through help with college and down
payments, before those grandchildren receive inheritances from
their parents, and those early investments in grandchildren’s
education and homeownership can appreciate over time.53
Homeownership is one of the most important vehicles for
intergenerational wealth transfer.54 Unfortunately, communities
of color have had fewer generations in which to accumulate and
transmit wealth than White communities.55
Additionally, income disparities affect access to housing
and homeownership. Scholars have noted that in the late 1800s
and the early 1900s, Black people who were able to secure higher
wages were able to access more desirable housing, often living in
the same areas as White people.56 Income was one of the most
important determinants of where people could live.57 Today, Black
and Latinx households earn significantly less than White
46 See generally IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE
(2005). In addition to income benefits, some post-war housing programs explicitly
excluded Black applicants. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 42, at 4–5, 22.
47 Coates, supra note 15, at 64.
48 Indeed, a desire to exclude Black people from the Social Security program
was the motivating factor for denying coverage for domestic and agricultural workers.
See id.; Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare, and the
Policing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1540, 1559 (2012);
Thomas, supra note 23, at 34.
49 Thomas, supra note 23, at 34.
50 Roithmayr, supra note 25, at 382–83.
51 Thomas, supra note 23, at 31, 38–40.
52 Fabian T. Pfeffer & Alexandra Killewald, Generations of Advantage.
Multigenerational Correlations in Family Wealth, 96 SOC. FORCES 1411, 1413 (2018).
53 Id. at 1415–16.
54 Id. at 1433–34.
55 Roithmayr, supra note 25, at 380; OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 42, at, 5–7.
56 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 42, at 19–20; Aric Short, Post-Acquisition
Harassment and The Scope of the Fair Housing Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 203, 251 (2006).
57 Short, supra note 56, at 250–51.
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households.58 Census Bureau data estimate that in 2017, the
median income for White (not Hispanic) households was $65,273,
while median income for Black households stood at $40,258 and for
Hispanic households, $50,486.59 The income disparity is not as
great as the wealth disparity, but it remains striking. Limited
income in many households of color continues to make
homeownership more difficult.
Finally, redlining has historically prevented many people
of color from borrowing capital to purchase homes.60 Redlining
involves the refusal by financial institutions to make loans for
properties in communities of color, regardless of the
creditworthiness of the loan applicant.61 In the early twentieth
century, the federal government promoted redlining through
various policies.62 In the 1930s, the Home Owners Loan
Corporation (HOLC), a federal program that refinanced
mortgages at risk of default and gave low-interest loans to people
who had lost their homes through foreclosure, color-coded maps
based on neighborhood “riskiness.”63 The HOLC consistently
ranked Black neighborhoods as the most risky and coded them
with the color red, giving this practice its name.64
Public discrimination enabled private discrimination. In
the 1940s and 1950s, the Federal Housing Administration,
Veterans Administration, and private banks adopted the HOLC
maps and used them to determine where to make or guarantee
loans.65 Private banks and government agencies denied
mortgages to loan applicants wishing to purchase property in the
red areas.66 As a result, many Black families were unable to access
the necessary credit for purchasing homes.67
C.

Limited Access to Place as a Barrier to Homeownership

In addition to the challenges of accessing capital, some
groups faced additional barriers to housing and homeownership
based on place. In the early 1900s, many local governments passed
exclusionary zoning ordinances restricting where Black people could
58 Jessica Semega, et al., Income and Poverty in the United States: 2017, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (2018), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2018/demo/income-poverty/p60263.html [https://perma.cc/TJ9C-HPPU].
59 Id.
60 Coates, supra note 15; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 42, at 51–52.
61 53 Fed. Reg. 44998 (Nov. 7, 1988).
62 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 42, at 51–55; Coates, supra note 15.
63 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 42, at 51.
64 Id. at 51–52.
65 Id. at 52–55.
66 Id. at 51–52; OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 42, at 23.
67 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 42, at 54–55; Coates, supra note 15.
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purchase or rent homes.68 Racial animus and a fear of reduced
property values drove this exclusionary zoning movement.69
Baltimore City Mayor J. Barry Mahool justified the city’s
exclusionary zoning ordinance by saying, “Blacks should be
quarantined in isolated slums in order to reduce the incidents of civil
disturbance, to prevent the spread of communicable disease into the
nearby White neighborhoods, and to protect property values among
the White majority.”70 In 1917, however, a unanimous Supreme
Court found exclusionary zoning ordinances unconstitutional
because they unlawfully interfered with people’s property rights.71
Once communities could no longer discriminate through
zoning ordinances, they turned to private covenants to restrict
where racial and religious minorities could live.72 Throughout
the first half of the twentieth century, private agreements
between buyers and sellers frequently restricted the sale and
rental of property to Black people, as well as those of Asian or
Jewish descent.73 These racially restrictive covenants existed
throughout the United States, not just in the South.74
In 1948, the United States Supreme Court heard two
consolidated cases challenging the use of state courts to enforce
racially restrictive covenants.75 The Supreme Courts of Missouri
and Michigan had upheld the enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants.76 On review, the U.S. Supreme Court found that
judicial enforcement of these covenants constituted unlawful,
discriminatory state action.77 While the Court did not prohibit the
racially restrictive covenants themselves, the government could
no longer enforce them.78
68 Christopher Silver, The Racial Origins of Zoning in American Cities, in
URBAN PLANNING AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY: IN THE SHADOWS 23 (June
Manning Thomas & Marsha Ritzdorf ed., 1997).
69 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 42, at 41.
70 STEVEN J. HOFFMAN, RACE, CLASS AND POWER IN THE BUILDING OF
RICHMOND, 1870-1920, at 174 (2004).
71 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).
72 RICHARD H. SANDER, ET AL., MOVING TOWARD INTEGRATION 69–70 (2018).
73 See, for example, covenant from King County, Washington, stating that “No part of
said property hereby conveyed shall ever be used or occupied by any Hebrew or by any person of the
Ethiopian, Malay or any Asiatic Race.” Database of 416 Racial Restrictive Covenants from King
County Recorder’s Office, RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS DATABASE, (emphasis added) http://depts.
washington.edu/civilr/covenants_database.htm [https://perma.cc/M882-NXNP]. See also covenant
from Minneapolis, Minnesota, stating that the property could not “be conveyed, mortgaged or
leased to any person or persons of Chinese, Japanese, Moorish, Turkish, Negro, Mongolian or
African blood or descent.” Hannah Jones, In 1930s Minneapolis, Not Just Anyone Got to be White,
CITYPAGES (July 24, 2018), (emphasis added) http://www.citypages.com/news/in-1930s-minne
apolis-not-just-anyone-got-to-be-white/488931381 [https://perma.cc/5ABX-8NJE].
74 SANDER ET AL., supra note 72, at 69–70 (2018); Coates, supra note 15.
75 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4 (1948).
76 Id. at 6–7.
77 Id. at 23.
78 Id. at 13.
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In its opinion, the Court described the importance of
housing in American life, saying:
It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be
protected from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth
Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of
property. Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded
by the framers of that Amendment as an essential pre-condition to the
realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which the
Amendment was intended to guarantee.79

Through cases like these, the Supreme Court incrementally
implemented protections against housing discrimination by public
actors. Private discrimination in housing still flourished, however,
as individual buyers and sellers chose to implement and honor
racially restrictive covenants,80 landlords continued to refuse to
rent to people based on race or religion,81 realtors engaged in
blockbusting and steering,82 and banks continued to engage in
discriminatory lending practices.83 Further, public discrimination
continued through segregation in schools,84 race-motivated policies
that restricted voting rights,85 and racially-based limitations on
marriage.86 In response, the Civil Rights Movement organized
around these issues, leading slowly to legislative change.87

Id. at 10.
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 42, at 188.
81 SANDER ET AL., supra note 72, at 69–70.
82 One scholar describes blockbusting as “spooking whites into selling cheap
before the neighborhood became black.” Coates, supra note 15; see also SANDER ET AL.,
supra note 72, at 110; Dmitri Mehlhorn, A Requiem for Blockbusting: Law, Economics,
and Race-Based Real Estate Speculation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145, 1151–52 (1998).
83 SANDER ET AL., supra note 72, at 69–70.
84 In 1964, the Civil Rights Act finally addressed segregation in federally
supported public schools. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 246
(1964). Despite the Supreme Court striking down segregation in public education in
1954, widespread discrimination continued. Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955);
Erica Frankenberg, Metropolitan Schooling and Housing Integration, J. AFFORDABLE
HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 193 (2009).
85 In 1965, the Voting Rights Act finally outlawed discrimination in voting.
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). For a discussion of
barriers to voting, see Dale E. Ho, Building an Umbrella in A Rainstorm: The New Vote
Denial Litigation Since Shelby County, 127 YALE L.J. F. 799, 800 (2018); Daniel P.
Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C.
L. REV. 689, 702 (2006).
86 It was not until 1967 that the United States Supreme Court declared bans
on inter-racial marriages to be unconstitutional. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 1 (1967).
87 Following the assassination of President Kennedy and the subsequent 1964
election, President Johnson and legislators supportive of civil rights passed protections
against discrimination in employment, education, public accommodations, and voting.
SANDER ET AL., supra note 72, at 130.
79
80
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BANKS’ DISCRIMINATORY MAINTENANCE OF FORECLOSED
PROPERTIES IN NEIGHBORHOODS OF COLOR

As the Civil Rights Movement gained momentum, the fight
for equal access to housing became a key focus of organizing efforts.
In particular, the Chicago Freedom Movement of the mid-1960s
centered on the need for fair housing protections.88 Between 1966
and early 1968, Congress considered four different versions of fair
housing legislation, but none passed both chambers.89 Tragically, it
took a monstrous act of racial hatred to spur political leaders to
finally enact federal fair housing legislation.90 On April 4, 1968, Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee.91
Communities across the country erupted in demonstrations of grief
and anger.92 Following years of failed legislative efforts, Congress
finally passed the federal Fair Housing Act less than a week after
Dr. King’s assassination.93 President Johnson signed the bill into law
on April 11, 1968.94 As a result, race-based housing discrimination
was no longer legal in the United States.95
A.

Implementation of Fair Housing Law

The FHA prohibits a broad range of discriminatory conduct.
Section 3604(a) of the FHA makes it illegal to “refuse to sell or rent
after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for
the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, or national origin.”96 Additionally, Section 3604(b) of the
FHA prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the
provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”97
Section 3617 makes it illegal to “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or
interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any
right” granted or protected by the FHA.98 Finally, courts have
Id. at 131.
Id. at 131–35; Robert G. Schwemm, Cox, Halprin, and Discriminatory
Municipal Services Under the Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 717, 758–59 (2008).
90 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 42, at 194.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 58–59, 194.
93 Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title VIII, § 801, 82 Stat. 81
(1968); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 42, at 194.
94 Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title VIII, § 801, 82 Stat. 81 (1968).
95 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606 (1988).
96 Id. § 3604(a) (emphasis added).
97 Id. § 3604(b) (emphasis added).
98 Id. § 3617 (emphasis added).
88
89
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repeatedly interpreted the FHA to include the perpetuation of
segregation as a fair housing violation.99
When initially passed, the FHA prohibited discrimination
in housing based on race, color, religion, and national origin.100 The
legislation addressed the historic discrimination against Black,
Asian, and Jewish people. Congress later expanded fair housing
law to include additional protected classes.101
Additionally, the understanding of what constitutes
discrimination has evolved. Early fair housing cases focused on
disparate treatment—discriminatory intent that led to people in
a protected class being treated differently because of their
protected characteristic. Over time, appellate courts and federal
agencies that enforced fair housing law came to recognize
disparate impact—the discriminatory effect of facially neutral
policies, practices, and procedures—to be as destructive as
disparate treatment and also a fair housing violation.102 Finally,
99 See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,
937 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d in part, 488 U.S. 15, 18 (1988); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill.
of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977).
100 Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title VIII, § 804, 82 Stat. 83 (1968).
101 In 1974, the Housing and Community Development Act added sex as a protected
class. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, Title VIII, § 808,
88 Stat. 728 (1974). Then, in 1988, the Fair Housing Amendments Act expanded federal
protections to include disability and familial status as protected classes. Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988). Although the federal
protected classes have not changed since 1988, some state and local fair housing laws now
include additional protected classes such as age, marital status, gender identity, and sexual
orientation. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-705 (West 2014) (discrimination
“because of race, color, religion, sex, disability, marital status, familial status, sexual
orientation, gender identity, or national origin” is illegal); Chicago, Ill., Ordinance 5-8-030(A)
(amend. Dec. 14, 2005) (“It shall be an unfair housing practice and unlawful . . . [t]o make any
distinction, discrimination or restriction against person . . . predicated upon the . . . gender
identity, . . . sexual orientation, marital status, . . . military status or source of income of the
prospective or actual buyer or tenant thereof.”); HOWARD COUNTY, MD, CODE, tit. 12 § 12.207
(amend. Apr. 2015) (“Discrimination/discriminatory means acting or failing to act, or unduly
delaying any action regarding any person(s) because of . . . [a]ge, [o]ccupation, [m]arital
status, [p]olitical opinion, [s]exual orientation, [p]ersonal appearance, . . . [s]ource of income,
or [g]ender identity or expression in such a way that such person(s) are adversely affected in
the area of housing.”).
102 Both the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) brought cases alleging disparate impact. See, e.g.,
Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1246
(10th Cir. 1995); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1181 (8th Cir. 1974).
Further, federal circuit courts consistently found disparate impact to be a cause of action
under the FHA. See 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 444 F.3d
673, 679–80 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir.
2000); Pfaff v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 745–46 (9th Cir. 1996);
Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1243, 1250–51; Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531,
1543 (11th Cir. 1994); Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 934–35;Hanson v. Veterans
Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5th Cir. 1986); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 57475 (6th Cir. 1986); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982);
Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146–48 (3d Cir. 1977); Arlington Heights,
558 F.2d at 1290; City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184.
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in 2015, the Supreme Court held that disparate impact claims
were cognizable under the FHA.103 Federal fair housing
protections today are much more comprehensive than they were
when the FHA was passed fifty years ago.
B.

Neighborhood-Based Discrimination and the FHA

People generally think of race-based housing
discrimination as a landlord’s refusal to rent to people of color,
or a bank denying them mortgages or giving them less favorable
financial terms than White applicants, but discrimination
because of an individual’s characteristics represents only one
aspect of race-based housing discrimination. Other examples of
race-based
discrimination
stem
from
neighborhood
characteristics rather than that of individual households. An
examination of fair housing case law clearly shows that racebased neighborhood discrimination is also unlawful.
Courts have found mortgage redlining, perhaps the most
well-known form of neighborhood-based housing discrimination,
to violate multiple parts of the FHA. In Laufman v. Oakley
Building and Loan Company, the plaintiffs sued Oakley for
denying a loan application because of the racial composition of
the neighborhood location of the house to be purchased.104 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
explained that redlining was a cause of action under FHA
Section 3604 because denying loans based on neighborhood
composition had the effect of making unavailable or denying
housing.105 Further, the Laufman court determined that
mortgage redlining violated Section 3617 because it interfered
with the exercise of equal housing opportunity.106 Other courts
similarly found that redlining in mortgages based on the racial
composition of the neighborhood violated the FHA.107
Today, courts recognize “reverse redlining”—the practice
of unfair or predatory mortgages in communities of color—as
103 Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015).
104 Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 498 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
105 Id. at 493.
106 Id. at 498.
107 See, e.g., Cartwright v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 880 F.2d 912, 925 (7th Cir. 1989)
(finding that redlining is actionable under Section 3604, although the complainant did not
establish that the loan denial was due to race-based redlining); Old W. End Ass’n v. Buckeye
Fed. Sav. & Loan, 675 F. Supp. 1100, 1102–03, 1105 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Thomas v. First Fed.
Sav. Bank of Ind., 653 F. Supp. 1330, 1340 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (finding that neighborhood
redlining violated the FHA, although the complainants did not establish that the bank denied
the loan because of neighborhood characteristics); Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mortg. Co.,
414 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
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also violating the FHA.108 Examples of reverse mortgage
redlining include granting applicants in Black neighborhoods
subprime mortgages with unnecessarily high interest rates and
fees even though they qualify for prime mortgages.109 It also
includes giving applicants in Black neighborhoods mortgages
they could not afford and should not have received.110 Reverse
redlining makes housing “unavailable” under Section 3604
because the unfair terms put borrowers at risk for defaulting on
their loans and losing their homes.111
Redlining in homeowners’ insurance policies also violates
the FHA. This occurs when companies refuse to insure
properties in neighborhoods of color or charge those homeowners
higher rates.112 When considering insurance redlining in 1992,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted
that for years, the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) had considered insurance
discrimination to be an act that made housing “unavailable”
under the FHA.113 The court went on to find that the language in
Section 3604 was “sufficiently pliable” to support such an
interpretation.114 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion a few years later.115
Noting that lenders require mortgage insurance as a condition
for obtaining a loan, the court reiterated its prior determination
that “Congress intended [Section] 3604 to reach a broad range of
activities that have the effect of denying housing opportunities
to a member of a protected class.”116 The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia similarly found that
108 See, e.g., Steed v. EverHome Mortg. Co., 308 F. App’x 364, 368–69 (11th Cir.
2009) (citing Hargraves v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 20 (D.C. 2000)); Mayor
and City Council of Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. JFM-08-62, 2011 WL 1557759, at *3
(D. Md. Apr. 22, 2011); Woodworth v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Ass’n, No. 09-3058-CL, 2011 WL
1540358, at *18 (D. Ore. Mar. 23, 2011); Diaz v. Bank of Am. Home Loan Servicing, No. CV
09-9286, 2010 WL 5313417, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2010); M & T Mortg. Corp. v. White, 736
F. Supp. 2d 538, 573-74 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Davenport v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 725 F. Supp.
2d 862, 875–76 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Williams v. 2000 Homes Inc., No. 09-CV-16, 2009 WL
2252528, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009); Hafiz v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 652 F.
Supp. 2d 1039, 1045–46 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Matthews v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 185 F.
Supp. 2d 874, 886–87 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Eva, 143 F. Supp. 2d. at 882; Honorable v. Easy Life
Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
109 See, e.g., Steed v. EverHome Mortg. Co., 308 F. App’x 364, 368-69 (11th Cir. 2009).
110 See, e.g., City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 09-2857-STA, 2011
WL 1706756, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. May 4, 2011).
111 Hargraves, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
112 NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1992).
113 Id. at 300.
114 Id.
115 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1358 (6th Cir. 1995).
116 Id. at 1359 (quoting Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337,
344 (6th Cir. 1994)).
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homeowners’ insurance redlining was a cause of action under
Section 3604 of the FHA.117
A third type of neighborhood-based discrimination that
violates the FHA occurs with race-based appraisals. An
appraisal textbook widely used until the late 1970s specifically
instructed appraisers to decrease the appraised value of
properties located in mixed-race neighborhoods.118 The textbook
“categorized different ethnic groups according to their
detrimental effect upon property values after their ‘infiltration’
into the neighborhood.”119 In 1976, the U.S. Attorney’s office sued
four organizations that promulgated and perpetuated these
discriminatory standards.120 The United States claimed that
devaluing properties because of neighborhood composition made
housing unavailable under Section 3604 and interfered with the
exercise and enjoyment of rights under Section 3617 of the
FHA.121 The case settled before trial.122 The terms included
revising the textbook and supporting materials to make clear
that such neighborhood discrimination was unlawful.123 In
another case involving alleged neighborhood-based appraisals,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
discussed this discriminatory textbook and the harms caused by
neighborhood-based discriminatory appraisals.124 The court
explained that “[d]iscriminatory appraisal may effectively
prevent blacks from purchasing or selling a home for its fair
market value. This interferes with the exercise of rights granted
by the Fair Housing Act.”125
It is undisputed that courts recognize race-based
neighborhood discrimination as a fair housing violation, having
repeatedly invalidated these practices. Scholars and advocates
are now considering new ways to apply the FHA in the
neighborhood-based discrimination context.

117 Nat’l Fair Hous. All., Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d
46, 63 (D.C. 2002).
118 Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1387 (5th Cir. 1986).
119 Id.
120 United States v. Am. Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers of Nat. Ass’n of
Realtors, 442 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1077.
124 Hanson, 800 F.2d at 1387.
125 Id. at 1386. Although the Court found that race-based appraisals would
violate the FHA, the Court affirmed the lower court’s finding that the complainants had
not established that race was the motivating factor in this particular case. Id.
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Banks’ Failure to Maintain Foreclosed Properties in
Neighborhoods of Color

The foreclosure crisis stemmed in part from predatory
lending by banks in neighborhoods of color. In a report to
Congress, HUD identified the increase in subprime loans as one
of the driving causes of the 2008 foreclosure crisis.126 HUD
described this phenomenon as “risky loans made to risky
borrowers.”127 For many of the loans made during the 2000s,
borrowers could not afford the payments at the time the loans
were made.128 Additionally, many non-traditional mortgages,
such as interest-only mortgages, allowed borrowers to purchase
more expensive homes than they normally could.129 These risky
loans were not evenly distributed throughout the population,
however. Rather, banks concentrated these loans in
communities of color. Indeed, Black and Latinx families with
annual incomes of more than $200,000 were more likely to
receive subprime loans than White families with annual incomes
less than $30,000.130
Unfortunately, race-based discrimination by banks
continued after the foreclosure crisis, when banks gained
possession of the foreclosed properties. Data from across the
United States show that banks are not maintaining foreclosed
properties in neighborhoods of color to the same extent that they
are maintaining foreclosed properties in White neighborhoods.131
The victimization of these communities continues.
126 OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS vi (2010),
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/Foreclosure_09.pdf [https://perma.cc/X585ANDZ].
127 Id. at 26.
128 Id. at 22.
129 Id. at 25–26.
130 Emily Badger, The Dramatic Racial Bias of Subprime Lending During the
Housing Boom, CITYLAB (Aug. 16, 2013), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2013/08/blacksreally-were-targeted-bogus-loans-during-housing-boom/6559 [https://perma.cc/6PYU-4N5D];
see also Ylan Q. Mui, For Black Americans, Financial Damage From Subprime Implosion is
Likely to Last, WASH. POST (July 8, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/for-black-americans-financial-damage-from-subprime-implosion-is-likelyto-last/2012/07/08/gJQAwNmzWW_story.html?utm_term=.252c394dee1e
[https://perma.cc/89AR-7ANG].
131 See, e.g., NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALL., ZIP CODE INEQUALITY: DISCRIMINATION BY
BANKS IN THE MAINTENANCE OF HOMES IN NEIGHBORHOODS OF COLOR 2 (2014), http://
nationalfairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2014-08-27_NFHA_REO_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M8Z9-M6GX]; NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALL., THE BANKS ARE BACK – OUR
NEIGHBORHOODS ARE NOT: DISCRIMINATION IN THE MAINTENANCE AND MARKETING OF REO
PROPERTIES (2012), http://nationalfairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Banks-areBack-Final-12.3.2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4ZJ-M7YX]; NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALL., HERE
COMES THE BANK, THERE GOES OUR NEIGHBORHOOD: HOW LENDERS DISCRIMINATE IN THE
TREATMENT OF FORECLOSED HOMES 2 (2011), http://nationalfairhousing.org/wp-content/
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1. Banks are Engaging in Discriminatory Maintenance
The National Fair Housing Alliance (NFHA) is a
consortium of non-profit fair housing organizations, civil rights
agencies, and individuals.132 Its mission is to “eliminate housing
discrimination and to ensure equal housing opportunity for all
people through leadership, education, outreach, membership
services, public policy initiatives, community development,
advocacy, and enforcement.”133 Since 2009, NFHA and its
member organizations have been investigating the maintenance
of foreclosed properties, known in the industry as “real estate
owned” (REO) properties. Their research concludes that some
banks maintain their REO properties in White and mixed-race
neighborhoods better than their REO properties in Black and
Latinx neighborhoods in the same city.134
The data are jarring but not altogether unexpected. The
first study, published in April 2011, catalogued over ten
thousand REO properties in Connecticut, Maryland, Ohio, and
Virginia. It documented maintenance efforts as demonstrated by
curb appeal (presence or absence of trash, whether mailboxes
were broken or overflowing with mail, and the appearance of
grass and shrubbery), structural problems (broken doors or
windows, holes in the walls, and damaged porches or stairs),
quality of paint and siding, the condition of gutters (cared for,
water damaged etc.), and signage and occupancy (presence or
absence of “for sale” or “no trespassing” signs, presence of
squatters).135 The study showed that in Connecticut, Maryland
and Ohio, REO properties in White or stable, mixed-race
neighborhoods scored significantly higher on the maintenance
index than homes in Black or Latinx neighborhoods.136
Foreclosed properties in White neighborhoods were “more likely
to have well-maintained lawns, secured entrances, and
professional sales marketing,” while foreclosed properties in
Black and Latinx neighborhoods were “more likely to have

uploads/2017/04/There-Goes-Our-Neighborhood-REO-report-2011-for-website.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2XNU-EH3P].
132 About NFHA, NFHA, https://nationalfairhousing.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/
H68K-YPWS].
133 Mission Statement, NFHA, https://nationalfairhousing.org/mission-statement
[https://perma.cc/9YV9-GMTF].
134 See supra note 131.
135 See NFHA, 2011 NFHA REPORT 15 (2011), https://nationalfairhousing.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/04/There-Goes-Our-Neighborhood-REO-report-2011-forwebsite.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XNU-EH3P].
136 Id. at 2.
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poorly maintained yards, unsecured entrances, look vacant or
abandoned, and have poor curb appeal.”137
A second report, released in April 2012, included a
similar analysis of over one thousand properties in Arizona,
California, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Washington, DC. The
findings were consistent with the earlier study. NFHA found
that REO properties in communities of color were eighty-two
percent more likely than REO properties in White communities
to have broken or boarded windows and forty-two percent more
likely to have more than fifteen maintenance problems than
those in White communities.138 Examples of maintenance
problems include accumulated mail, damaged steps or fences,
graffiti or damaged siding, hanging gutters, and exposed or
tampered with utilities.139
NFHA’s third study, released in August 2014,
corroborated prior findings. NFHA concluded that REOs in
White neighborhoods were more likely to have professionalquality “for sale” signs, well-maintained lawns, and secured
entrances than REOs in neighborhoods of color.140 Further,
REOs in neighborhoods of color were not maintained to the same
standards of the surrounding, occupied housing as the REOs in
White neighborhoods.141 As a whole, “REOs in communities of
color were 2.2 times more likely to have . . . trash and debris” on
the property, “2.3 times more likely to have unsecured . . . or
damaged doors,” twice as likely to have unsecured or damaged
windows, and 2.1 times more likely to have holes in the structure
of the house than REOs in White neighborhoods.142 The
disparities in some cities were even more dramatic.143
Financial institutions deny the allegations of
discriminatory maintenance of REOs. Bob Davis, executive vice
president for mortgage policy for the American Bankers
Association, said “[b]anks take care of these houses to preserve
their collateral regardless of where the property is located. Banks
operate and are examined under fair lending and fair housing
laws to ensure equal treatment across all communities.”144 A
Id.
THE BANKS ARE BACK – OUR NEIGHBORHOODS ARE NOT: DISCRIMINATION IN
THE MAINTENANCE AND MARKETING OF REO PROPERTIES, supra note 131, at 2–3.
139 See id. at 17.
140 See ZIP CODE INEQUALITY: DISCRIMINATION BY BANKS IN THE MAINTENANCE
OF HOMES IN NEIGHBORHOODS OF COLOR, supra note 131, at 2.
141 See id.
142 See id. at 2–3.
143 See id. at 3.
144 Janel Ross, Banks Fail to Maintain Foreclosed Homes in Minority
Neighborhoods: Report, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 4, 2012), https://www.huffpost.com/
137
138
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spokesperson for Wells Fargo wrote that the bank “conducts all
lending-related activities in a fair and consistent manner without
regard to race: this includes maintenance and marketing
standards for all foreclosed properties for which we are
responsible.”145 Similarly, Andrew Wilson, spokesperson for
Fannie Mae, denied the allegations, writing “We are confident
that our standards ensure that properties in all neighborhoods
are treated equally, and we perform rigorous quality control to
make sure that is the case. We remain dedicated to neighborhood
stabilization efforts across the nation, including with respect to
our maintenance of foreclosed properties.”146 Bank of America
attacked the NFHA reports, calling them “inaccurate and
misleading,”147 and a spokesperson for Safeguard, the property
management company for Bank of America, called the pending
lawsuit “ill-conceived and disingenuous.”148
Despite the financial institutions’ denials of
discrimination, additional data demonstrate the harms caused
by poorly maintained REOs. If the effects of poor maintenance
were confined to the foreclosed properties themselves, the
discriminatory maintenance might not matter as much.
However, poorly maintained, foreclosed properties clearly have
negative effects for surrounding homeowners, community
members, and public entities. First, municipalities must spend
public resources to maintain neglected, vacant units. A 2011
study released by the Government Accountability Office showed
the cost of boarding up and securing properties ranged from
$233 to $1,400 per property.149 Officials in Chicago estimated
that the city had spent $875,000 to board up vacant properties

entry/banks-foreclosed-homes-minorities-banks-reo_n_1404134 [https://perma.cc/5EPKR2YU].
145 Cora Currier, Big Banks Slack on Maintaining Foreclosed Homes in Minority
Areas, Complaint Charges, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 16, 2012), https://www.propublica.org/
article/big-banks-slack-on-maintaining-foreclosed-homes-in-minority-areas-complaint
[https://perma.cc/6EYR-QBUZ].
146 Catherine Dunn, Fannie Mae Fails to Maintain Foreclosed Homes in Black and
Latino Neighborhoods, Discrimination Complaint Alleges, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 13, 2015),
https://www.ibtimes.com/fannie-mae-fails-maintain-foreclosed-homes-black-latinoneighborhoods-discrimination-1921137 [https://perma.cc/J7B4-8JYU].
147 Luz Lazo, Fair Housing Group: Bank of America Foreclosed Homes in White
Neighborhoods Are Better Maintained Than Those in Black and Latino Neighborhoods,
WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2016/08/31/fairhousing-group-bank-of-america-foreclosed-homes-in-white-neighborhoods-are-bettermaintained-than-those-in-black-and-latino-neighborhoods/?utm_term=.3dbc8aaad5e7
[https://perma.cc/PFS6-YMDR].
148 Bui, supra note 6.
149 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 3, at 37.
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in 2010 alone while Detroit officials estimated that the city had
spent $1.4 million in about a year to secure vacant properties.150
Second, foreclosure leads to higher violent crime rates.
One study examining the link between foreclosure and crime
found that a one percentage point increase in an area’s foreclosure
rate leads to a 2.33 percent increase in violent crime.151 High
crime rates decrease quality of life for neighborhood residents and
necessitate increased public expenditures for police services. In a
complaint against Wells Fargo for its discriminatory maintenance
of REO properties, the City of Miami documented the increased
demand for “police, fire, and building and code enforcement
services” as a result of foreclosures.152
Additionally, research on the impact of foreclosed singlefamily homes shows a statistically significant, negative effect on
neighboring home values.153 Studies place the decrease
somewhere between 0.7 percent and ten percent, depending on
the city and statistical model used.154 A Chicago study found that
each foreclosure within one-eighth of a mile reduced a home’s
value by over one percent and each foreclosure within a oneeighth to one-quarter of a mile range reduced a home’s value by
0.325 percent.155 In low and moderate-income areas, the
foreclosure effect was even greater. In the latter, each foreclosed
property within one-eighth of a mile reduced the value of
surrounding homes by 1.44 percent to 1.8 percent.156 The
cumulative effect of multiple foreclosures in an area can
devastate property values.
This decrease in property values, however, is especially
problematic for neighboring homeowners in communities of
color. Although homes are the most important asset for most
families, households of color rely even more heavily on home
equity as a source of wealth than do White households.157 Thus,
Id.
This study used census data; business count data from Dun and Bradstreet,
a private data analysis company; and statistics from the Chicago Police Department to
calculate the effect of single-family foreclosures on property and violent crime rates in
Chicago. Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage
Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime, 21 HOUS. STUDIES 851, 863 (2005).
152 Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1301–02 (2017).
153 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 3, at 44-46 (summarizing results
from several studies with different methodologies); DAN IMMERGLUCK & GEOFF SMITH, THERE
GOES THE NEIGHBORHOOD: THE EFFECT OF SINGLE-FAMILY MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES ON
PROPERTY VALUES 7 (2005) (determining home values from sales data from the Illinois
Department of Revenue and property characteristics from the Cook County Assessor’s Office).
154 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 3, at 44–46.
155 THERE GOES THE NEIGHBORHOOD: THE EFFECT OF SINGLE-FAMILY
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES ON PROPERTY VALUES, supra note 153, at 9 (2005).
156 Id.
157 KOCHHAR, FRY & TAYLOR, supra note 35, at ch. 2.
150
151
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any condition that decreases home values in communities of
color is especially troubling. That the decrease results from
discrimination is even worse. In sum, banks have harmed
homeowners in Black and Latinx neighborhoods by draining
local governments of important funds, raising rates of violent
crime, and lowering the value of property belonging to
homeowners of color through discriminatory housing practices
in violation of the FHA.
2. Discriminatory Maintenance by Banks Violates the
FHA
In 2014, fair housing advocates used existing case law
regarding race-based neighborhood discrimination to show that
the unequal maintenance of REO properties by banks violates the
FHA.158 Equating discriminatory maintenance to redlining, they
showed that the FHA—as currently interpreted—could be used to
hold financial institutions liable for discriminatory maintenance
of foreclosed properties.159 This same analysis became the basis
for a pending HUD complaint filed against Bank of America by
NFHA and more than fifteen local fair housing organizations.160
This article extends that argument, showing how that analysis is
applicable to neighboring homeowners, as well, who might also
want to sue banks engaging in discriminatory maintenance.161
First, failure to maintain REO properties in neighborhoods
of color makes housing unavailable under the FHA.162 If a property
is uninhabitable, potential buyers might assume it is either not for
sale or would involve costly repairs to compensate for deferred
maintenance.163 Poor maintenance essentially removes these
158 Stephen M. Dane, Tara K. Ramchandani & Anne P. Bellows, Discriminatory
Maintenance of REO Properties as a Violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act, 17 CUNY
L. REV. 383, 387 (2014).
159 Id. at 388–89.
160 Sixth Amended Fair Housing Complaint at 1–2, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Bank
of Am. Corp., No. 04-13-0016-8, Inquiry No. 349549 (HUD Aug. 31, 2016), https://natio
nalfairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Complaint-Against-Bank-of-America1.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJQ5-UV9Y].
161 In addition to discriminatory maintenance, banks’ failure to advertise their
REO properties in neighborhoods of color as actively or positively as those in White
neighborhoods runs afoul of the FHA, which prohibits discrimination in the advertising
of dwellings. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). The regulation implementing this part of the FHA
specifically states that “[r]efusing to publish advertising for the sale” or having different
terms for advertising because of race is unlawful. 24 C.F.R. § 100.75(c)(4) (2018). The
bank practice of posting “warning” signs in neighborhoods of color communicates that
they are unsafe or undesirable. Although not the focus of this article, the NFHA studies
also documented banks’ discriminatory signage.
162 Dane et al., supra note 158, at 390–91; Sixth Amended Fair Housing
Complaint, supra note 160, at 73.
163 Dane et al., supra note 158, at 391–93.
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properties from the housing market.164 In fact, some unmaintained
REO properties fall into such disrepair that they must be
demolished, literally making them unavailable.165
HUD regulations describing prohibited conduct clearly
establish that it is unlawful “to discourage or obstruct choices in
a community, neighborhood or development” based on race.166
The regulations further state that it is illegal to discourage
anyone “from inspecting, purchasing or renting a dwelling
because of [the] race . . . of persons in a community,
neighborhood or development.”167 When banks fail to maintain
foreclosed properties, and those properties become blighted with
trash, broken fixtures, unkempt grass and shrubbery, and other
signs of decay, the properties become less attractive to potential
buyers, who are deterred from acquiring those properties in
violation of the federal regulations.168
Second, because REO properties are supposed to be
available for sale, failure to maintain these homes in
neighborhoods of color constitutes discrimination under Section
3604(b).169 The HUD regulations relating to this section of the FHA
specifically list “[f]ailing or delaying maintenance or repairs of sale
or rental dwellings” based on race as prohibited discriminatory
conduct.170 When banks maintain REO properties in White
neighborhoods but not in neighborhoods of color in the same city, it
shows they are choosing to engage in discriminatory maintenance,
not that they are unable to perform any maintenance.
Third, discriminatory maintenance of REO properties
violates the FHA because it perpetuates segregation. Although not
explicitly stated in the FHA, both state and federal courts have
consistently recognized the perpetuation of segregation as a fair
housing violation under federal law.171 Historically, perpetuation of
Id. at 393.
Sixth Amended Fair Housing Complaint, supra note 160, at 73.
166 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(a) (2018).
167 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(c)(1) (2018).
168 Sixth Amended Fair Housing Complaint, supra note 160, at 72–73; Dane et
al., supra note 158, at 392.
169 Dane et al., supra note 158, at 394–95. It is unlawful to discriminate “in the
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of
services or facilities in connection therewith.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2012).
170 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(2).
171 See, e.g., Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 938 (“[R]efusal to amend the
restrictive zoning ordinance to permit privately-built multi-family housing outside the
urban renewal area significantly perpetuated segregation”); Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
at 1290 (“[I]f [a housing decision] perpetuates segregation and thereby prevents
interracial association it will be considered invidious under the Fair Housing Act”); Otero
v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973) (explaining that the goal of the
FHA was to promote “open, integrated residential housing patterns and to prevent the
increase of segregation”); United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1097 (N.D.
164
165
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segregation claims have been brought against municipalities that
used zoning decisions to block the construction of mixed-race or
mixed-income housing in White communities.172 This sort of claim,
however, is applicable to the discriminatory maintenance of REO
properties, as well. First, it makes it less likely that other buyers,
including White buyers, will purchase in neighborhoods of color.173
If foreclosed properties in neighborhoods of color are poorly
maintained, buyers in general and, in particular, buyers with more
purchasing power will likely be deterred. Second, reduced home
values in neighborhoods of color decrease the buying power of those
homeowners, making it less likely that they will be able to
purchase in more affluent, often integrated or White,
neighborhoods.174 As these civil rights advocates explain,
discriminatory maintenance by banks ends up “re-entrenching the
economic dynamics that maintain racial segregation.”175
Another scholar arguing for expanding the application of
fair housing law created a framework to help determine whether
entities should be held liable under the FHA.176 The framework
considers the degree of control the bad actor has over the
housing situation and the duration of the relationship between
that actor and the person harmed.177 The more control the bad
actor has to influence the housing situation and the longer the
relationship between the actor and the person being harmed, the
stronger the basis for holding that bad actor liable.178 In the case
of banks engaging in discriminatory maintenance of REO
properties, they exercise a tremendous amount of control over
the housing situation. As the lawful owners responsible for
maintenance, they have almost exclusive control over the
condition of the REO property. When the poor condition of those
homes reduces property values within the neighborhood,
homeowners are powerless. It can take months or even years to
resell these homes, particularly if banks refuse to make needed
repairs.179 Homeowners can only watch as the equity in their own
Ohio 1980) (finding that the city “consistently ha[d] made decisions which have
perpetuated and reinforced its image as a city where blacks are not welcome. This is the
very essence of a pattern and practice of racial discrimination.”).
172 ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION
§ 10:7 (2014).
173 Dane et al., supra note 158, at 396.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 See Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights of
Occupants Under the Fair Housing Act, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 39–50 (2008).
177 See id. at 51–62.
178 See id. at 49.
179 Not only does the foreclosure process itself drag on for years in some
jurisdictions, but banks can be slow to respond to purchase offers after foreclosing on the
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homes melts away because the banks are allowing properties
they control to deteriorate in ways that damage the property
values of people living in the neighborhood. Based on this
analysis, it is reasonable to hold banks liable for the effects of
their discriminatory maintenance on the most economically
vulnerable homeowners in society.
Individual homeowners in neighborhoods being adversely
affected by banks’ discriminatory maintenance also have a cause
of action. Although the HUD complaint filed against Bank of
America by the National Fair Housing Alliance and local fair
housing organizations included only organizational plaintiffs, on
June 26, 2018, two homeowners joined with NFHA and nineteen
fair housing organizations to sue Bank of America in federal
district court.180 Courts have established that fair housing
organizations have standing to sue, but the same is not true for
individual homeowners. To date, there has been no judicial
decision that homeowners like Ms. Onafuwa and Ms. Bushnell,
whose properties are immediately adjacent to REOs, or other
homeowners in the neighborhood, including those on different
blocks, have standing to sue under the FHA.
III.

NEIGHBORING HOMEOWNERS AND THE FHA’S
AGGRIEVED PERSON STANDARD

To hold banks liable for discriminatory maintenance of
foreclosed properties in neighborhoods of color, homeowners
must establish that they have standing to sue under the FHA.
Federal fair housing law allows an “aggrieved person” to file suit
in state or federal court or file a complaint with HUD.181 The
FHA defines an aggrieved person as “any person who—(1) claims
to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (2)
believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory
housing practice that is about to occur.”182
In the context of discriminatory maintenance of REO
properties, the question is whether neighboring homeowners
whose property values are negatively impacted were injured, as
contemplated by the FHA. This article argues that access to
housing should be understood to include protection of the home’s
property. See As Number of Foreclosed Homes Grows, So Does Mold, NPR (July 13, 2011),
https://www.npr.org/2011/07/13/137629788/as-number-of-foreclosed-homes-grows-sodoes-mold [https://perma.cc/US3Y-QYCB].
180 See generally Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 1; Sixth
Amended Fair Housing Complaint, supra note 160.
181 42 U.S.C. §§ 3613(a), 3610(a)(1)(A) (2012).
182 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i).
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value and neighborhood quality of life and, therefore,
discriminatory actions that decrease residential property values
and deteriorate the community violate the FHA. Some courts have
found that the discriminatory provision of municipal services
violates the FHA, and such discrimination—which degrades
neighborhood quality of life—is similar to banks’ discriminatory
maintenance of foreclosed properties.183 However, in 1984, the
Seventh Circuit took a different, incorrect view of what constitutes
a fair housing violation in the provision of services.
A.

The Southend Case and the Seventh Circuit’s Limited
Understanding of Access to Housing

The FHA defines a dwelling as “any building, structure,
or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended
for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, and any
vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction
or location thereon of any such building, structure, or portion
thereof.”184 In prohibiting discrimination regarding dwellings,
the FHA must be understood to protect more than initial access
to housing, despite the Seventh Circuit decision.
In Southend, the Seventh Circuit considered whether a
county’s failure to maintain tax delinquent properties in
predominantly Black neighborhoods constituted unlawful
discrimination under the FHA.185 In that case, homeowners and
not-for-profit organizations in East St. Louis sued St. Clair County
for failing to either board up or demolish dilapidated buildings the
183 A majority of courts that have addressed the issue suggested that discriminatory
provision of municipal services violates the FHA; however, some courts have found that the FHA
does not cover this sort of discriminatory conduct. For examples of courts suggesting or finding
that discriminatory provision of municipal services violates the FHA, see Shaikh v. City of
Chicago, 341 F.3d 627, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that municipal services such as
zoning, police protection, and fire protection are covered by § 3604(b)); Good Shepherd Manor
Found., Inc. v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 565 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that the city would
have violated the FHA if it had cut off the water supply because of discriminatory intent);
Edwards v. Johnston Cty. Health Dep’t, 885 F.2d 1215, 1224-25 (4th Cir. 1989) (suggesting that
§ 3604(b) might prohibit discriminatory provision of some municipal services); Southend
Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n v. St. Clair Cty., 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating
that Section 3604(b) “applies to services generally provided by governmental units such as police
and fire protection or garbage collection”); Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 424
(4th Cir. 1984) (stating that Section 3604(b) “encompasses such things as garbage collection and
other services of the kind usually provided by municipalities”); Lopez v. City of Dallas, No. 3:03CV-2223-M, 2004 WL 2026804, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2004) (finding that discriminatory
provision of municipal services violated § 3604(b)); Miller v. City of Dallas, No. CIV.A.3:98-CV2955-D, 2002 WL 230834, at *1, 14 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2002) (stating that Section 3604(b) covers
municipal services such as protection from nuisances and floods); Campbell v. City of Berwyn,
815 F. Supp. 1138, 1143–44 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (upholding § 3604(b) claim alleging discriminatory
termination of police protection).
184 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b) (1988).
185 See generally Southend, 743 F.2d 1207.
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County had acquired through tax sales.186 The plaintiffs claimed
that the County’s actions reduced the value of their own properties
and prevented them from accessing loans or making contracts.187
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the County’s
actions violated the FHA by making the dwellings “unavailable”
and discriminating in the provision of services under Sections
3604(a) and 3604(b).188 The complaint alleged that
The County of St. Clair, at all times relevant to this action, with
respect to property to which it holds a tax deed, and which is located
in predominantly black areas, (1) has failed and refused to comply
with its statutory obligation to prevent waste on any of the premises
involved, and to ensure that the premises are maintained in good
condition and repair, that the subject property is preserved, and that
the public’s safety, with respect to such property, is protected; (2) has
failed and refused to comply with its obligations under local
ordinances to demolish all unsafe buildings on such property; and (3)
has failed and refused to comply with its obligation to maintain that
property in such a manner that the health and welfare of residents of
the surrounding neighborhood is not endangered.189

The Seventh Circuit found that the County did not violate either
Section 3604(a) or Section 3604(b) of the FHA. The court
interpreted the statute to apply only to literal availability,
focusing on discriminatory acts that interfered with the
acquisition of housing.190 The Seventh Circuit went on to say that
the FHA “does not protect the intangible interests in the
already-owned property raised by the plaintiffs [sic]
allegations.”191 In other words, the court held that a plaintiff’s
claim does not extend to intangible, post-acquisition interests.
The court then concluded that the FHA “was not designed to
address the concerns raised by the complaint.”192 In Southend,
the Seventh Circuit interpreted the FHA narrowly. This decision
is inconsistent with both prior and subsequent Supreme Court
decisions, which embraced a broad construction of the FHA and
recognized economic harm as conferring standing.

186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Id. at 1208.
Id.
Id. at 1209–10.
Id. at 1209.
Id. at 1210.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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Supreme Court Decisions Contradicting Southend

A number of Supreme Court decisions that span the life
of the FHA confirm a cause of action based on intangible
interests.
1. Early Cases Established Standing for More Than
Denial of Physical Access to Housing
The Supreme Court first addressed the statutory
construction of the FHA in 1972, merely four years after the
FHA became law. In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, the Supreme Court heard a case in which tenants (one
Black and one White) alleged that discrimination against nonWhite rental applicants to the complex harmed the tenants in
the complex.193 They were not only denied the benefits of living
in an integrated community, but had also missed out on
professional opportunities that come from mixed-race contacts,
and suffered the embarrassment and stigma of being associated
with a “white ghetto.”194 In determining whether the tenants had
standing under the FHA, the Court described the statutory
language as “broad and inclusive.”195
The Court went on to cite the FHA’s legislative history,
noting that senators who supported or drafted the legislation
were concerned about harm to the “whole community,” not just
the target of the discriminatory act, and that one of the goals of
the FHA was to create “truly integrated and balanced living
patterns.”196 In holding that the tenants had standing to sue for
discriminatory acts directed against others, the Supreme Court
stated that “generous construction” of the complaint-filing
provision was the only way to “give vitality” to the FHA.197 With
this decision, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the right
of people who had not been denied physical access to housing to
sue for intangible harms experienced through discriminatory
conduct directed against others.
Seven years later, the Supreme Court extended the scope
of community for standing purposes from the apartment
complex addressed in Trafficante to a much larger twelve-by
thirteen-block residential neighborhood.198 In Gladstone, the
193
194
195
196
197
198

See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972).
Id. at 206–08.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 211.
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 (1995) (citing id. at 212).
See Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 95 (1979).
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Court considered a case in which a real estate company was
alleged to have steered Black homebuyers to one part of the
neighborhood and White homebuyers to another.199 In explaining
its finding that the homeowners had standing under the FHA,
the Court said that it perceived “no categorical distinction
between injury from racial steering suffered by occupants of a
large apartment complex and that imposed upon residents of a
relatively compact neighborhood.”200
In addition to broadening the geographic scope of the
community being harmed by discriminatory conduct, the
Supreme Court determined declining home values to be a basis
for standing under the FHA. It said that “convincing evidence
that the economic value of one’s own home has declined as a
result of the conduct of another certainly is sufficient under
Art[icle] III [of the Constitution] to allow standing to contest the
legality of that conduct.”201 The Court further explained that
[a] significant reduction in property values directly injures a
municipality by diminishing its tax base, thus threatening its ability
to bear the costs of local government and to provide services. Other
harms flowing from the realities of a racially segregated community
are not unlikely. As we have said before, “[t]here can be no question
about the importance” to a community of “promoting stable, racially
integrated housing.” If, as alleged, petitioners’ sales practices actually
have begun to rob Bellwood of its racial balance and stability, the
village has standing to challenge the legality of that conduct.202

Thus, the Court clearly found that damage to economic interests
conferred standing under the FHA.
The Supreme Court again heard the issue of third party
standing and neighborhood harm in 1982 and found that the
FHA applies to more than the initial acquisition of housing. In
Havens Realty Corporation v. Coleman, a case involving alleged
racial steering in a rental community, the Court defined the
indirect injury that gives rise to “neighborhood standing” as “an
adverse impact on the neighborhood in which the plaintiff
resides resulting from the steering of persons other than the
plaintiff.”203 The Court again recognized that discriminatory acts
against other individuals could lead to injury of surrounding
community members.204 The Court then reaffirmed that the FHA
protects “the right to the important social, professional, business
199
200
201
202
203
204

Id. at 94–95.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 110–11 (internal citations omitted).
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 375 (1982).
Id.
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and economic, political and aesthetic benefits of interracial
associations that arise from living in integrated communities
free from discriminatory housing practices.”205 Again, a
unanimous Supreme Court defined injury under the FHA to
include more than the acquisition of housing, and the benefits of
housing to be more than the dwelling’s physical structure.
Throughout these cases, the Supreme Court had
developed a body of case law that interprets the FHA
expansively so that it covers a wide range of people experiencing
a wide range of harms. The people protected include those who
live in housing but experienced intangible damages as a result
of discriminatory conduct.
2. Recent Supreme Court Decision Affirms Standing for
Entities Financially Harmed by Discriminatory
Maintenance
The Supreme Court continues to find that the FHA
protects against injuries beyond access to the physical structure
of housing. In 2017, the Supreme Court heard a case in which
the City of Miami sued Bank of America and Wells Fargo for
predatory lending.206 Specifically, the City alleged that the banks
gave riskier mortgages with less favorable terms to applicants
of color than to similarly-situated White applicants, and that
these predatory loans led to high rates of default among
borrowers of color.207 The City claimed that the discriminatory
lending “(1) ‘adversely impacted the racial composition of the
City,’ (2) ‘impaired the City’s goals to assure racial integration
and desegregation,’ (3) ‘frustrate[d] the City’s longstanding and
active interest in promoting fair housing and securing the
benefits of an integrated community,’ and (4) disproportionately
‘cause[d] foreclosures and vacancies in minority communities in
Miami.’”208 The City alleged that it was harmed because the
foreclosures decreased property values and led to lower tax
revenues.209 Further, the foreclosures forced the City to increase
spending on municipal services to correct unsafe and dangerous
conditions on the foreclosed properties.210 The City’s damages
were primarily economic in nature.
Id. at 376.
See generally Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).
207 Id. at 1300–01.
208 Id. at 1301 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Joint Appendix
at 229, 232-33, 413, 416–17, Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, Fla., 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017)
(No. 15-1111 & 15-1112), 2016 WL 4502302).
209 Id.
210 Id.
205
206
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The banks argued that the City lacked standing under
the FHA. They claimed that the City was not an “aggrieved
person” because the damages the City allegedly suffered fell
outside the “zone of interest” that the FHA was intended to
protect.211 The Supreme Court disagreed. It ruled that “the City’s
claimed injuries fall within the zone of interests that the FHA
arguably protects.”212 Thus, the City was an aggrieved person
under the statute.213 The Supreme Court clearly found that the
City had standing to bring fair housing claims against banks
that had allegedly engaged in discriminatory lending.
In its analysis, the Court cited prior standing decisions
and explained that statutory standing requires that a statute
“grants the plaintiff the cause of action that he asserts.”214 More
specifically, a statute grants a cause of action if the plaintiff falls
within the zone of interest.215 The Court explicitly concluded that
“lost tax revenue and extra municipal expenses” satisfied the
standing requirement.216
Additionally, the Court noted congressional intent to
“confer standing broadly” and referenced its prior statutory
interpretations in Trafficante, Gladstone, and Havens.217 It noted
that when Congress last amended federal fair housing law in
1988, it did nothing to limit the definition of “aggrieved person,”
despite being aware of Supreme Court precedent interpreting
the definition broadly.218 The Court went on to say that
“Congress normally adopts [the Court’s] interpretations of
statutes when it reenacts those statute [sic] without change.”219
Both congressional intent and prior Supreme Court
precedent justified finding that a City that had suffered
economic harm as a result of predatory lending and resulting
foreclosures was an aggrieved person under the FHA. The
situation of neighboring homeowners is similar. They, too, suffer
harm when they expend resources to respond to dilapidated
REOs. Further, their resource base suffers when their home
values decline, just as cities suffer from a decreased tax base due
to declining property values.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1302.
Id.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1303–04.
Id. at 1304.
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3. Thomas’ Dissent and the Issue of Neighboring
Homeowner Standing
Justice Thomas strongly disagreed with the majority in
City of Miami. In his dissent, he argued that the City’s injuries
fell far outside the FHA’s intended zone of interest.220 He
described the “quintessential aggrieved person” as being a
prospective buyer or renter who experienced discrimination
during an attempt to secure housing.221 He downplayed Supreme
Court precedent by writing that prior cases “suggested that the
interests of a person who lives in a neighborhood or apartment
complex that remains segregated (or that risks becoming
segregated) as a result of discriminatory housing practice may
be arguably within the outer limit of the interests the FHA
protects.”222 He understated the clear decision of a unanimous
Supreme Court in Trafficante.223
After spending the bulk of his dissent critiquing the
majority decision to confer standing on the City, Justice Thomas
made a seemingly offhand remark about the standing rights of
neighboring homeowners negatively impacted by banks’
discriminatory behavior. He said that “[u]nder Miami’s own
theory of causation, its injuries are one step further removed
from the allegedly discriminatory lending practices than the
injuries suffered by the neighboring homeowners whose houses
declined in value. No one suggests that those homeowners could
sue under the FHA, and I think it is clear that they cannot.”224
Justice Thomas is wrong.
C.

Legislative Intent and the Goals of the FHA

The idea of “home” and benefits it confers are important
to Americans, and linked to a variety of interests, including
financial security.225 It is indisputable that the main proponents
of the FHA saw access to housing—including homeownership—
as a way to promote access to opportunity, and that the ultimate
goal of the FHA was to combat a broad range of social problems.
Indeed, in one hearing on proposed fair housing legislation,
Id. at 1307.
Id. at 1309.
222 Id. (emphasis added).
223 The majority even noted Justice Thomas’ understatement, writing “[c]ontrary
to the dissent’s view, those cases did more than ‘sugges[t]’ that plaintiffs similarly situated
to the City have a cause of action under the FHA. They held as much.” Id. at 1303 (internal
citation omitted).
224 Id. at 1312 (emphasis added).
225 See Iglesias, supra note 22, at 531.
220
221
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Senator Walter Mondale from Minnesota stated that “[d]eclining
tax base, poor sanitation, loss of jobs, inadequate educational
opportunity, and urban squalor will persist as long as
discrimination forces millions to live in the rotting cores of
central cities.”226 Senator Edward Brooke from Massachusetts
then exhorted the Senate to act, saying “we can and should make
it possible for those who can to move to where the better schools
and services, the decent homes and jobs are most plentiful. That
is the simple purpose of this bill.”227 The Senators recognized
that housing discrimination perpetuated a broad range of social
ills. The FHA offered a tool to reverse these negative trends.
In particular, these senators focused on how fair housing
was intended to promote access to a quality education. Senator
Mondale noted that “housing discrimination has a serious
adverse effect on education in the ghettos,” and then went on to
say that “[f]air housing is, therefore, more than merely housing.
It is part of an educational bill of rights for all citizens.”228
Senator Mondale further said that fair housing “is absolutely
essential to the realistic achievement of such accepted goals as
desegregated schools and equal opportunity.”229 The drafters saw
access to quality education as critical for Black communities and
intended the FHA to increase access to education.
A second goal of the FHA was to promote access to
employment. Senator Mondale described the plight of Black
people trapped in inner cities, saying that in the early 1960s,
“one-half to two-thirds of all new factories and stores in all areas
of the country except the South were located outside the central
cities and metropolitan areas. This trend is expected to continue.
Jobs can move to the suburbs, but housing discrimination
prevents Negroes from following.”230 Senator Brooke explained
that “if Negroes are able to live where they want, then they will
be able to get these jobs.”231 The authors of the FHA saw access
to employment as essential for Black communities and intended
the FHA to increase access to good jobs.
A third goal of the FHA was to affirm the value of Black
people and undo the psychological harm of being second class
citizens. In discussing the problems stemming from
discrimination, Senator Mondale said

226
227
228
229
230
231

114 Cong. Rec. 2274 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
114 Cong. Rec. 2280 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke).
114 Cong. Rec. 2276 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
Id.
114 Cong. Rec. 3421 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
114 Cong. Rec. 2282 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke).
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[i]n each of our comments, we emphasized many of the material aspects
of this problem, whether it is the quality of housing or the quality of
education, the availability of decent employment, the environment in
terms of water, air, and transportation, law enforcement, playgrounds,
and all the other aspects of a desirable community; but I wonder if
perhaps more important than any of those is the psychological insult and
the impact of that insult upon the ghetto dweller.232

Senator Mondale later went on to say, “It is impossible to gage the
degradation and humiliation suffered by a man in the presence of
his wife and children when he is told that despite his university
degrees, despite his income level, despite his profession, he is just
not good enough to live in a white neighborhood.”233
Senator Brooke, himself a Black man, pleaded with his
colleagues to address what he described as the “psychological
impact” of discrimination.234 He said, “I can testify from personal
experience, having lived in the ghetto, what it does to the inside
of a man to live in such shameful conditions, to be in an area
which has been marked for second-class citizens, in an area which
few are able to escape.”235 The drafters of the FHA recognized the
intangible, psychological harm that stemmed from discrimination
and intended that the legislation would stop that harm.
It is clear that the FHA offers remedies for a broad range of
harms. In the federal district court case filed in June 2018, the
individual homeowner plaintiffs sued Bank of America for both fair
housing and private nuisance violations.236 The complaint detailed
the particular harms they experienced by being adjacent to the
vacant, foreclosed properties.237 Water leaked into Ms. Onafuwa’s
basement from the side of the foreclosed property.238 Overgrown
grass, accumulated trash, and a dilapidated garage next door led to
a rodent infestation.239 A squatter lived in the unsecured house.240
Ms. Onafuwa’s damages included damage to her home as well as
emotional distress and mental anguish.241
Similarly, Ms. Bushnell claimed both monetary and
emotional damages. Robbers broke into her house through the
wall from the vacant, adjacent rowhouse, resulting in more than
$3,000 in damage and loss.242 After another attempted break-in
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242

114 Cong. Rec. 2281 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale) (emphasis added).
114 Cong. Rec. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
114 Cong. Rec. 2282 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke).
114 Cong. Rec. 2281 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke).
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 1, at 4–5.
See generally id.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 94–95.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 98.
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from the adjacent, foreclosed house, Ms. Bushnell purchased a
security system and security doors.243 Squirrels entered her attic
from the attic next door and she had to hire a trapping service.244
She had to expend significant personal resources because Bank
of America did not maintain its foreclosed property.
Although the complaint did not allege a specific drop in
value for either Ms. Onafuwa’s or Ms. Bushnell’s property, the
complaint did allege that “the presence of deteriorated and/or
dangerous REOs in a neighborhood affects the home values of
surrounding homeowners.”245 The complaint further alleged that
“[p]ersons living in communities adversely affected by [Bank of
America’s] practices and conduct have seen their property values
and enjoyment of their homes diminished.”246 Not only do Ms.
Onafuwa and Ms. Bushnell have causes of action against Bank of
America for damage incurred as a result of Bank of America’s
discriminatory maintenance, so, too, do other homeowners in the
neighborhood. The complaint filed in 2018 is a good start but does
not go far enough to pursue remedies for all the people harmed by
Bank of America’s discriminatory conduct. Other neighbors in the
neighborhood whose property values were adversely affected are
also aggrieved persons under the FHA.
Indeed, it seems that the legislators who were the
strongest proponents of fair housing legislation did not see
the physical infrastructure of housing as the final goal.
Rather, they focused on the benefits—often financial and
intangible benefits—that come from access to housing. They
saw housing as a way to increase income through better jobs,
to live up to potential through access to quality education,
and to confirm people’s innate dignity.
This justification for fair housing is consistent with the
claim that neighboring homeowners whose property values
declined as a result of banks’ discriminatory maintenance
practices are aggrieved persons under the FHA. When property
values fall, those families have less money available to invest in
businesses, to finance higher education or transmit to future
generations for down payments and other purposes. Their
opportunities are stifled, much like the victims of housing
discrimination in the 1960s. The FHA confers standing on both.
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Id.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 109.
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES FACING NEIGHBORING
HOMEOWNERS SEEKING RELIEF UNDER THE FHA

Establishing standing—that they are within the zone of
interest—is just the first hurdle that neighboring homeowners
must overcome in order to succeed in claims against discriminatory
banks. In order to succeed on the merits, they must also establish
that the FHA applies to post-acquisition discrimination and that
the banks were the proximate cause of their injuries. While the
issue of post-acquisition discrimination has been addressed at
length by scholars so is of less concern,247 the standard for
proximate cause in these FHA cases is still uncertain.
A.

The Halprin Case is Not a Barrier to Neighboring
Homeowners

In Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn
Park Association, the Seventh Circuit broke with prior case law
and limited the post-acquisition application of the FHA.248 Since
then, other courts have followed suit.249 However, Halprin was
wrongly decided.
The Halprin case involved Jewish homeowners in a
subdivision with a homeowners’ association.250 The president of
that association wrote religious slurs on the Jewish homeowners’
property, vandalized their plants and holiday lights, and tore down
the flyers the homeowners had placed around the neighborhood
requesting help in identifying the culprit.251 The homeowners’
association then protected the association’s president by destroying
meeting minutes as well as an audio recording in which he
threatened the Jewish homeowners.252
In their complaint, the homeowners alleged that the
president and homeowners’ association had violated Sections
3604 and 3617 of the FHA.253 The Seventh Circuit found that
See generally Oliveri, supra note 176; Schwemm, supra note 89; Short, supra note 56.
Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d
327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004). For a discussion of case law prior to Halprin, see Oliveri, supra
note 176, at 12–16.
249 For a complete overview of cases, see Oliveri, supra note 176, at 33. Specific
examples include Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 2005); Reule v. Sherwood
Valley I Council of Co-Owners, Inc., No. CIV.A. H-05-3197, 2005 WL 2669480, at *4 (S.D. Tex.
Oct. 19, 2005); Lawrence v. Courtyards at Deerwood Ass’n, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1143 (S.D.
Fla. 2004); King v. Metcalf 56 Homes Ass’n, No. 04-2192-JWL, 2004 WL 2538379, at *3 (D.
Kan. Nov. 8, 2004).
250 Halprin, 388 F.3d at 328.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Second Amended Complaint at 19, Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes
of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 2002 WL 32676010 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2002).
247
248
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defendants had not violated Section 3604 because although that
section could be interpreted to include constructive eviction, in
which someone was no longer able to live in their house and the
housing was thus made unavailable, the prohibition did not
apply to post-acquisition harassment of the sort described in the
case.254 The Seventh Circuit interpreted the FHA’s legislative
history to mean that Congress was only concerned with the
acquisition of housing, not treatment once someone obtained
housing. The court said
Behind the Act lay the widespread practice of refusing to sell or rent
homes in desirable residential areas to members of minority groups.
Since the focus was on their exclusion, the problem of how they were
treated when they were included, that is, when they were allowed to
own or rent homes in such areas, was not at the forefront of
congressional thinking. That problem—the problem not of exclusion
but of expulsion—would become acute only when the law forced
unwanted associations that might provoke efforts at harassment, and
so it would tend not to arise until the Act was enacted and enforced.
There is nothing to suggest that Congress was trying to solve that
future problem, an endeavor that would have required careful drafting
in order to make sure that quarrels between neighbors did not become
a routine basis for federal litigation.255

The court then went on to say that while the Section 3604 claim
failed, the claim under Section 3617 could go forward because
the HUD regulation interpreting it seemed to unlink it from
Section 3604.256 Section 3617 makes it illegal to
coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the
exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or
enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other
person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected
by [S]ection . . . 3606 of [the FHA].257

Under the related regulation, illegal conduct includes
“[t]hreatening, intimidating or interfering with persons in their
enjoyment of a dwelling because of the race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin of such persons, or
of visitors or associates of such persons.”258 The regulation makes
no mention of the statutory language related to denying housing
or making it unavailable, which would predicate a Section 3617
violation on a Section 3604 violation. The Seventh Circuit opined
that the regulation likely exceeded the statutory authority by
254
255
256
257
258

Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 330.
Id. at 328 (emphasis added).
24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2016).
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separating Section 3617 from Section 3604, but that the
defendants had not properly raised that issue below so they
forfeited the right to challenge the regulation on appeal.259
For two reasons, this opinion appears to create challenges
for neighboring homeowners who want to bring FHA claims
against banks that fail to maintain REO properties. First, it
would seem that the homeowners cannot allege that their housing
is being made unavailable or denied or that there is
discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith” since they already acquired their housing
and still inhabit it.260 Second, the Halprin case suggests that the
regulation interpreting Section 3617 is unconstitutional. Scholars
have demonstrated, however, that this decision is flawed.
First, the statutory language seems to show that
Congress contemplated the application of the FHA to postacquisition claims. The definition of a “dwelling” under the
statute includes structures that are “occupied as . . . a
residence.”261 In the context of disability protections, the FHA
similarly protects against discrimination based on the disability
of “a person residing in” the unit.262 Congress did not limit the
FHA to dwellings intended or desired to be occupied as a
residence, but rather drafted the FHA to apply to people already
living in the home.263 Further, when Congress amended the FHA
for the final time in 1988, it did not clarify that the FHA applied
to only the acquisition of housing, despite courts previously
applying the FHA to post-acquisition discrimination.264 If
Congress intended the FHA to apply to only pre-acquisition
discrimination, it had an opportunity to revise the statute to
make that intent clear. It chose not to do so.
Second, because Title VII employment protections apply to
current employees facing harassment, not just job applicants, the
FHA should also be interpreted to apply to people currently living
in housing, and not just people attempting to acquire that
housing.265 The Supreme Court has previously analogized the FHA
to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act for purposes of determining

Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1988).
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Short, supra note 56, at 213–17.
264 Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (Pub. L. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619);
Oliveri, supra note 176, at 32.
265 Oliveri, supra note 176, at 24–25; Schwemm, supra note 89, at 720–21
(2008); Short, supra note 56, at 240.
259
260
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standing, and other courts have followed suit.266 Because
employment law is well-settled regarding application to current
employees, the same certainty should be read into the FHA.267
Additional arguments justify the claim that Halprin was
wrongly decided. Notably, both the Department of Justice and HUD
have taken the position that the FHA applies to post-acquisition
discrimination and that Halprin was incorrectly decided.268 For
purposes of this article, it is sufficient to note that although Halprin
presents some challenges to neighboring homeowners wishing to sue
banks under the FHA, good legal arguments exist to overcome those
challenges. Those arguments are well-developed in existing
literature.269 The same is not true for the question of what
constitutes “proximate cause” under the FHA.
B.

Proximate Cause as an Unsettled Area of Fair Housing
Law

When the Supreme Court issued its 2017 decision in
Bank of America Corporation v. City of Miami, it focused most of
its opinion on the issue of standing and whether the City fell
within the FHA’s zone of interest.270 At the end of its decision, it
briefly addressed the issue of causation under the FHA.271 The
Eleventh Circuit had determined that the banks’ discriminatory
lending had proximately caused the City’s damages—lost tax
revenue and increased expenditures on municipal services.272
The Supreme Court disagreed.
In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit relied on tort
law to interpret proximate cause. The Eleventh Circuit noted that
the Supreme Court had previously likened a FHA claim for
damages to a tort action, subject to general tort rules.273 It then
cited a recent United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
decision in which the court explained that “[t]he doctrine of
proximate cause serves merely to protect defendants from

Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
For a more detailed analysis of the basis for using Title VII to interpret the
FHA for post-acquisition protection, see Schwemm, supra note 89, at 758–59 (2008);
Short, supra note 56, at 240–44.
268 Schwemm, supra note 89, at 729.
269 See generally Oliveri, supra note 176, at 32; Schwemm, supra note 89; Short,
supra note 56.
270 Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1301–05 (2017).
271 Id. at 1305–06.
272 City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1282 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).
273 Id. at 1279 (citing Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003); Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974)).
266
267
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unforeseeable results of their unlawful conduct.”274 The Eleventh
Circuit then found that the City had made an “adequate showing”
of foreseeability, based on the data presented.275
On review, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior analysis
that a damages claim under the FHA was like a tort action.276
However, it found that “foreseeability” did not indicate a close
enough connection to meet the proximate cause standard.277 It
explained that “[t]he housing market is interconnected with
economic and social life.”278 An allegedly discriminatory act could
have far-reaching ripple effects and “[n]othing in the [FHA] suggests
that Congress intended to provide a remedy wherever those ripples
travel.”279 Because the Eleventh Circuit had used the wrong test, the
Supreme Court did not determine whether the City had satisfied the
proximate cause requirement. Further, the Court concluded its
opinion without determining what proximate cause required in this
context, leaving that issue for the lower courts. The Supreme Court
did hold, however, that there had to be “some direct relation between
the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”280
On remand, the City filed amended complaints against
Bank of America and Wells Fargo, but the district court denied
leave to amend and dismissed the case, again finding that the
City could not adequately establish proximate cause.281 On
review for a second time (“Miami II”), the Eleventh Circuit held
that the district court had erred in dismissing the cases, finding
that the City had plausibly alleged that the banks’
discriminatory lending and maintenance practices led to a
reduction in tax revenue despite failing to show a direct relation
between the banks’ actions and the municipal expenditures for
public services.282 The Eleventh Circuit made clear that it was
not finding that the City had actually established proximate
cause; rather, it had pled it sufficiently regarding the tax
revenue claim to survive a motion to dismiss, and that the City
should be allowed to proceed with its complaints accordingly.283
It is too early to know how the district court or appellate courts
will interpret the evidence once the case goes to trial.
274 Id. at 1282 (citing Pac. Shores Properties, LLC v. City of Newport Beach,
730 F.3d 1142, 1168 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted) (emphasis added)).
275 Id.
276 City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1305.
277 Id. at 1306.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 Id. (citing Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).
281 City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 923 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2019).
282 Id.
283 Id.
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Although the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Miami II
deals with a less strict standard,284 its analysis offers one
approach to determining proximate cause. Two parts of the
court’s analysis are particularly relevant to neighboring
homeowners’ ability to establish proximate cause. First, the
Eleventh Circuit found that the City showed “some direct
relation” between the banks’ alleged misconduct and the City’s
loss in tax revenue through decreased home values.285 The
amended complaints referenced regression analysis showing the
relationship between the banks’ lending practices, foreclosure
rates and processes in communities of color, and changes in
property value.286 The court found that the City “plausibly
alleged a calculable harm and has made more than a formulaic
recitation of how the causation requirement will be met,” stating
further that it would be up to experts at trial to determine
whether the regression analysis actually proved what the City
claimed.287 Thus, it is clear that the Eleventh Circuit at least
considers statistical analysis of aggregate data potentially
sufficient to prove a causal relationship between banks’
discriminatory conduct and financial loss due to decreased
property values. While individual homeowners would likely lack
the training and data to perform statistical analysis themselves,
they could join lawsuits brought by fair housing programs and
cities who have the resources and expertise to do that analysis.
Although the Miami II holding deals with cities’ ability to
sue banks for predatory lending and discriminatory maintenance,
dicta in the decision highlights a challenge facing neighboring
homeowners also wishing to sue under the FHA. The court clearly
contemplates neighboring homeowners suing for decreased
284 The court said, “For this case to proceed past a motion to dismiss, we need
not find that the Banks’ actions in fact proximately caused the plaintiff ’ s injuries; we
must find that the City plausibly alleged that they did so.” Id.
285 Id.
286 The complaint explained the regression analysis as follows:

Routinely maintained property tax and other data allow for the precise calculation
of the property tax revenues lost by the City as a direct result of particular [bank]
foreclosures. Using a well-established statistical regression technique that focuses
on effects on neighboring properties, the City can isolate the lost property value
attributable to [the Banks’] foreclosures and vacancies from losses attributable to
other causes, such as neighborhood conditions. This technique, known as Hedonic
regression, when applied to housing markets, isolates the factors that contribute to
the value of a property by studying thousands of housing transactions. Those
factors include the size of a home, the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, whether
the neighborhood is safe, whether neighboring properties are well-maintained, and
more. Hedonic analysis determines the contribution of each of these house and
neighborhood characteristics to the value of a home.
Id.
287

Id.
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property value, but expressed concern about using regression
analysis to document individual household harm instead of
aggregate, neighborhood or city-wide harm.288 The court did not say
neighboring homeowners could not prove loss of their individual
property value due to banks’ actions; rather, the court said they
would have “substantially more difficulty plausibly alleging that
they could calculate damages attributable to the Banks’ actions
with a reasonable degree of certainty.”289 Thus, while neighboring
homeowners could pursue litigation against banks engaging in
predatory lending and discriminatory maintenance, they would
have to develop a rigorous method for showing how the banks’
actions led to their particular property’s decline in value. While
likely not feasible on their own, neighboring homeowners could
partner with fair housing programs and their statistical experts to
develop such strategies.
At this point, only one appellate court has had the
opportunity to consider what constitutes proximate cause under
the FHA, and that was only at the motion to dismiss stage, and
only a few district courts have issued opinions involving the
proximate cause standard.290 The standard is still unclear. In the
absence of more specific Supreme Court guidance or decisions
from multiple circuit courts, scholars and advocates are left to
propose different approaches to proximate cause and then wait
for appellate review.
A recent article proposes adopting a tort law “scope of
liability” approach to proximate cause liability under the FHA.291
The authors note that the Supreme Court has historically taken
an “expansive view” of what constitutes sufficient causation and
found that the FHA protects people suffering from the

288 The court stated that “[c]onceivably the banks could face suits by many
homeowners who were discriminated against, or who lost property value because their
neighbors’ houses were foreclosed on.” Id. However, it went on to say that “the regression
analysis that can isolate the impact of redlining on the neighborhood scale could not solve this
problem on the individual level because of the diversity of individual circumstances.” Id.
289 Id. (emphasis added).
290 Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Deutsche Bank, No. 18 C 0839, 2018 WL 6045216 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 19, 2018) (granting motion to dismiss without prejudice and ordering plaintiffs to file
amended complaint showing a statistical disparity in REO maintenance); County of Cook v.
HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 950, 954 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (granting motion to
dismiss county’s claims that the bank’s actions increased costs for social services and
demolishing homes and led to decreased tax revenue and other revenue due to abandoned,
foreclosed, and vacant properties because proximate cause was not sufficiently pled in this
particular complaint); City of Philadelphia v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. CV 17-2203, 2018 WL
424451, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2018) (denying motion to dismiss because city “plausibly [pled]
proximate cause for its non-economic injuries” related to its interest in integration and
promoting fair housing).
291 See generally Steil & Traficonte, supra note 8.
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“continuing effect” of discriminatory conduct.292 The authors
then suggest a “scope of liability” standard in which the test for
proximate cause is “whether the harm for which damages are
sought was a result of one of the risks that made the defendant’s
conduct a violation of the [FHA].”293
Under this approach, a plaintiff must establish that the
harm experienced was “a realization of some risk that falls within
the duty that the [FHA] imposes on the defendant.”294 The authors
then argue that the economic and non-economic harms cities have
experienced due to banks’ discriminatory maintenance of REOs fall
within the scope of liability approach to proximate cause.295 The
cities should thus be able to recover under the FHA.
Courts might adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, or
the scholars’ approach, or something entirely different. One fair
housing scholar noted the trend in federal courts narrowing
coverage of civil rights antidiscrimination laws.296 How this will
play out in the context of the FHA is yet to be determined,
especially since the composition of the Supreme Court will likely
change in the next few years before these decisions make their
way through the system.
Regardless of the approach courts adopt, a neighboring
homeowner attempting to sue a bank for discriminatory
maintenance of REOs in their neighborhood would have to show
a clear connection between the bank’s discriminatory acts and
the particular homeowner’s reduction in property value. The
mechanics of that analysis are beyond the scope of this article or
this author’s expertise. However, the growing collaboration
between fair housing advocates and social scientists and the
increased reliance on data to understand fair housing trends
suggests that such analysis is possible. Further, for neighboring
homeowners like Wanda Onafuwa and Chevelle Bushnell—who
suffered out-of-pocket expenses directly related to the conditions
of the units next door—the proximate cause is clear. These
women, at a minimum, would be able to recover from the bank
for its discriminatory conduct.
CONCLUSION
In the introduction to the 1968 Kerner Report,
commissioned by President Lyndon B. Johnson in response to
292
293
294
295
296

Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1266.
Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1282.
Schwemm, supra note 89, at 720.
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the racial unrest of the mid-1960s, the Kerner Commission
wrote that “What white Americans have never fully
understood—but what the Negro can never forget—is that white
society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions
created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society
condones it.”297 What was true of central cities in the 1960s
continues to be true for neighborhoods of color today. The
financial institutions that previously denied access to capital
unleashed predatory mortgages on communities of color and now
engage in destructive, discriminatory maintenance of foreclosed
properties in Black and Latinx neighborhoods.
The drafters of the FHA saw access to housing as a way to
promote access to opportunity and enacted the FHA to combat a
broad range of social problems. Access to housing should be
understood to include protection of the home’s value and
neighborhood quality of life. When banks engage in
discriminatory maintenance of foreclosed properties in
neighborhoods of color, neighboring homeowners face limited
opportunity as a result of decreased home values and degraded
physical environment. It follows, then, that discriminatory
actions that decrease residential property values and deteriorate
the community violate the FHA. Because the Supreme Court
interprets the FHA broadly and the legislative history shows that
Congress was concerned with a broad range of harms being
experienced by people of color when it passed the FHA,
neighboring homeowners have standing to sue banks for unequal
maintenance of foreclosed properties in neighborhoods of color.

297 KERNER COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CIVIL DISORDERS (1968). The purpose of the Commission was to study the causes of violence
and racial unrest and propose public policy solutions to prevent future violence. MASSEY &
DENTON, supra note 42, at 3–4. The report identified residential segregation as one of the
leading causes of racial inequality. Id. at 4.

